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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Phil L. Hansen,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a municipal
corporation, by and through its BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Mayor J. Bracken Lee,
and Commissioners George B. Catmull, Louis
E. Holley, Conrad B. Harrison, and James
L. Barker, Jr.; its CHIEF OF POLICE, Dewey
J. Fillis; and/or its LICENSE ASSESSOR,
Thad Emery,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
11047
(Consolidated
with
No. 11174

THE VAGABOND CLUB, et al.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11174
(Consolidated
with
No.11047

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT- RESPONDENT
IN CASE NO. 11047
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IN CASE NO. 11174

NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah is seeking a declaratory judgment and to enjoin Salt Lake City from the enforcement
of the municipal ordinance which licenses and regulates
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nonprofit social clubs, athletic and recreational associations. This case which has been consolidated with
the case involving seven private clubs who filed an
action against Salt Lake City to enjoin the enforcement
of this same ordinance against them individually.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
After the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, the matter was tried
before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
After argument of counsel and briefs submitted on the
law, Judge Anderson issued a memorandum decision
which held that the ordinance was passed pursuant to
a grant of power contained in Section 10-8-81, U.C.A.
1953 and that said statute was proper and constitutional. The court further found that Section 11-10-1,
U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the 1967 Legislature extended to the city the right to license and regulate nonprofit corporations in addition to all others pertaining
to the consumption of liquor. It further found that
Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. 1953, and the grant of power
contained therein and in co-application with the above
two sections, gave to Salt Lake City the right to regulate liquo~ as long as the ordinance passed for that
purpose was not prohibited by the Legislature or in
conflict with the state liquor laws. The court concluded
that the state had failed to meet the burden of establishing that defendants' ordinance was either in con-
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travention of law or unconstitutional and, in any event,
that the state is not a proper party to raise that question
in this case.
The consolidated cases of the private clubs against
Salt Lake City were filed in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County and a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction was issued
therefrom. That court asked that a Judge outside the
jurisdiction be assigned to hear this matter and the
case came on before Judge F. "\V. Keller on the 1st
day of November, 1967, in his courtroom at Price,
Utah, wherein argument of counsel was heard and a
proper amount of time was allowed for counsel to
prepare briefs in support of their arguments. On December 7, Judge Keller issued a declaratory judgment
in which he found that the grant of power contained
in Section 10-8-81, U.C.A. 1953, gave the city the right
to regulate and license the clubs then before the court.
Secondly, the court found that in eliminating the provisions from Section 11-10-1 excepting nonprofit corporations, the 1967 Legislature intended that the city have
the right to license and regulate the liquor locker clubs
as pertaining to the consumption of liquor. That
pursuant to the grant of power given in Section 108-42, U.C.A. 1953, and as applied in conjunction with
the above sections that Salt Lake City had the right
to regulate liquor as long as the ordinance passed for
that purpose was not specifically prohibited by the
Legislature or in conflict with the state liquor laws.
He denied the plaintiffs' contentions therein that Sec-
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tion 11-10-1 through 4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, was
unconstitutional and held that the ordinance, Section
20-29-1 through 25, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, Utah, 1965, was valid except for the provisions
requiring that the chief of police be given a key to the
premises of the clubs and that police officers may enter
the club house without a search warrant. Thus requiring
the officers to procure a proper search warrant prior
to their inspecting the clubrooms or the premises.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The city desires that the decision of the Honorable
Aldon J. Anderson be upheld in its entirety and that
in the consolidated cases involving the private clubs
that the decision of Judge Keller be upheld except
for that portion which requires that police officers procure search warrants prior to inspection of the club,
premises and seeks that that portion of the judgment
be reversed thereby authorizing the peace officers to
enter the clubs pursuant to the ordinance and that the
club owners furnish a key or other device which will
allow immediate access to the clubrooms.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The city enacted its ordinance on May 9, 1967,
desiring to regulate and license all nonprofit clubs and
associations, said ordinance to be effective one month
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after it~ passage by the Salt Lake City Commission.
The day before the ordinance was to become effective,
the State of Utah through its Attorney General filed
this action to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance
and declare the ordinance null and void.
Upon the decision of the Honorable Aldon J.
Anderson, the Attorney General appealed to this honorable court for a temporary injunction staying the
enforcement of said ordinance, said petition was denied.
Immediately after such denial, the seven private clubs,
( consolidaed case No. 1117 4,) filed an action to enjoin
the enforcement of this ordinance as pertaining to them
and for a declaration that said ordinance was improper
and unconstitutional. All other clubs who come within
the ordinance have been licensed by Salt Lake City's
license assessor. A copy of the ordinance is repeated
in its entirety in the record of case no. 11047 (R 25-27).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CITY HAS THE RIGHT TO LICENSE
AND REGULATE SOCIAL, RECREATIONAL
AND ATHLETIC CLUBS AND ASSOCIATIONS.
In the recent case of Salt Lake City v. Town House
thletic Club et al., 18 U.2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967),
this court clearly established the power of a municipal
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corporation to license and regulate nonprofit social clubs
and said:
" ... as presently granted by Section 10-8-81,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the city may license
and regulate non-profit social clubs but it may
do so only once."
The statute that gives to the municipality this authority
reads as follows :
"10-8-81. Social clubs and athletic associations-Regulation.-They niay regulate all social club_s, recreational associations, athletic
associations and kindred associations, whether
incorporated or not, which maintain club rooms
or regular meeting rooms within the corporate
limits of the city."

In that case defendant's sole defense was based upon
its allegation that the control of the nonprofit corporations organized as liquor locker clubs was vested solely
in the Secretary of State. This control having been
preempted by the state pursuant to Sections 16-6-13
through 15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and Section
11-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as then written).
The court considered this matter fully and found:
"The statutes cited above and relied upon
by the _clubs do not, except perhaps as regards
the activities of storing and consuming liquor,
remove from municipal corporations the power
to license and regulate activities of non-profit
social clubs, to the extent such power may have
been delegated to them by other, though earlier,
statutes. 'Ve do not here hold that, as regards
6

the activity of storage and consumption of liquor
the regulatory power is in fact pre-empted to th~
State. That issue is not before us in this case."
There can Le no doubt from the court's decision in the
Towne House case and its interpretation of Section
10-8-81, U.C.A. 1953, that municipalities have the right
to regulate and license social clubs, athletic and recreational associations located within the boundaries of said
city.
The defendant heeding the instructions of this
Court in the Towne House case then passed an all
inclusive "one" ordinance covering the regulation of
all activities of social clubs, athletic and recreational
associations. (Section 20-29-1 to 25, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, a copy of the
ordinance being attached and made a part of plaintiff's
complaint.)
The Attorney General in his brief filed in this
matter in numerous passages has alluded to the fact
that Salt Lake City's ordinance was written only to
"persecute" liquor locker clubs which are situated within
Salt Lake City. A very cursory reading of the ordinance in question would readily expose the fact that
this ordiance is intended to apply to all social, recreational and athletic clubs of a nonprofit nature. Even
the Ladies Literary Club, wherein no liquor consumption, storage or sale takes place is included and
classified as a Class A club. All clubs are required
to comply with the health, fire and such other regulations
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as need be promulgated to protect the general welfare
of the community as outlined in Sections 12 , 13 ' 17 '
18 and 19 of the ordinance.
The regulation of consumption of liquor and beer
along with other activities were included. All regulatory
licenses which had previously been purchased by the
clubs and associations from defendant covering such
things as dancing, beer consumption, restaurants, coin
operated amusement and music devices and card tables,
could no longer be issued because of the "Towne House"
case decision.
The court did not decide if the city had the right
to regulate and license these clubs for liquor consumption. This then is the issue before us in the present case.

POINT II
THE CITY HAS PO,VER TO CONTROL
AND LICENSE CONSUMPTION OF LIQUOR
IN ALL ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING
PRIVATE CLUBS.
The 1959 Legislature expressly gave to the city
the right to license and regulate the consumption of
alcoholic beverages in all establishments except those
nonprofit corporations which were organized under
Section 16-6~13 through 13.3, U.C.A. and known as
liquor locker clubs. The 1967 Legislature eliminated
from Section 11-10-1, U.C.A. 1953, that part which
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specifically excludes the liquor locker clubs. Our Supreme Court interpreted this section when it said:
"Section 11-10-1, U.C.A. '53 enacted in 1959,
delegates to cities the power to regulate 'all establishments, associations and corporations' except those covered by Section 16-6-13 to 13.3,
U.C.A. 1953 (said exception since removed by
1967 Legislature) who 'operate a club, business
or association which allows the customers, members or guests to possess or consume liquor on
the premises, provided the license does not permit
the licensee, operator or employee of either to
hold, store or possess liquor or the premises' ".
(Emphasis and explanation ours) Salt Lake
City vs. Towne House Athletic Assoc., op. cit.
By its elimination of the exception in the above
law, the Legislature clearly intended that the local
subdivision have power and control over the consumption of liquor in liquor locker clubs. There can be no
doubt that the Legislature desired that the local governing bodies who are now charged with enforcement
of the state liquor laws be empowered to exercise
control over not only businesses and nonprofit organizations which are not corporations but also the liquor
locker clubs.
It is the contention of the Attorney General that
this statute is but a mandatory licensing provision for
revenue purposes without any power to regulate the
consumption of liquor (allegation #12 of the State's
complaint). The power to license comes under either
the police power or the taxing power. To help clarify
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respondent's position, we quote from 33 Am. Jur.,
Licenses, § 19:
"The name given a license law by the legislature is not controlling, but in the last analysis,
whether an imposition is in fact a tax or an aid
to regulation is to be determined by the substance of the law imposing it. A license imposition upon a business or occupation which is not
calling for police regulations is a revenue tax.
However, a license enactment is a tax when,
and only when, revenue is the main purpose
for which it is imposed. In general, therefore,
where the fee is imposed for the purpose of regulation, and the statute requires compliance with
certain conditions in addition to the payment
of the prescribed sum, such sum is a license
proper, imposed by virtue of the police power;
but where it is exacted soley for revenue purposes and its payment gives the right to carry
on the business without any further conditions,
it is a tax." 33 Am. Jur., Licenses, §19.
A look at the very basic nature of the thing to be
licensed, liquor consumption, brings the conclusion that
it comes strictly within the police power. There is no
right either natural or constitutional within an individual or legal entity in the consumption or sale of
liquor. Randles v. Washington State Liquor Board,
33Wash.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531.
"The manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquors, and even their possession or use, is not
a matter of common, inherent, or natural right,
but, if a right at all, is one held subject to the
police power of the state." Green Mountain
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Post v. Liquor Control Board, 117 Vt. 405, 94
A.2d 230, 35 A.L.R.2d 1060.
This court has reached the same decision in Riggins
vs. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183,
51 P.2d 645 (1935).
In Provo City vs. Provo Meat and Packing Co.,
49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 530,
(1917), this court established that the right to regulate
carries with it the right to license and impose a fee.
The questoin now before the court is whether the right
to license conversely carries with it the right to regulate.
It is the position of respondent that it clearly has the
power of regulation particularly when dealing with a
subject which is so very clearly within the police power.
In taking a close look at the entire "set up law"
itself, one finds that it is meant to be regulatory inasmuch as the subsequent sections 2 through 4 prescribe
qualifications and requirements pertaining to the license
and limits the amount of fee to be charged which indicates that it is a regulatory license and not for revenue
only. If we, therefore, follow the general rule of statutory construction to consider the entire statute as a
whole, we see that this statute conveys to the political
subdivision the power to regulate the consumption of
liquor.
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POINT III
THE STATE HAS NOT PREEl\IPTED TO
ITSELF THE CONTROL OF LIQUOR.
One will not find within the State Liquor Code
Title 32, U.C.A.) an express or implied statement that
the Legislature intended to preempt the control of
liquor strictly to itself. This court has held that the
Legislature must be clear in its expression of its intention to preempt to itself the regulation of any activity
which may occur within the state. Salt Lake City vs.
K usse, 97 U tab 113, 93 P .2d 671 ( 1938) .
The Attorney General spent innumerable pages in
his brief outlining the history of liquor consumption
statutes since the first pioneer entered the Great Salt
Lake Valley. This history was very interesting but of no
value in that the Legislature completely revised the
statutes of the State of Utah in 1933. At that time the
predecessors of Sections 10-8-81 and 10-8-42 were included in the new statutes clearly exhibiting an intention
on the part of the Legislature to continue those powers
and controls in the hands of the local and political subdivisions.
The State Liquor Code was passed by the following session in 1935. It could have clearly eliminated
the effect of Section 10-8-42 and Section 10-8-81 by
making a ·positive statement that the state desired to
preempt to itself the regulation of intoxicating liquors
but did not do so. We are, therefore, required to presume that the Legislature intended the local governing
unit to continue to have such authority as expressed
in these two sections.

12

Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. is as much in effect today
as when it was originally passed. The cities are granted
the power to prohibit "except as otherwise provided
by law" any person from illegally possessing, using
or selling intoxicating liquor.
There has been a general assumption that the Liquor
Control Act of the State of Utah in Title 32, U.C.A.
1953, completely preempted the field of liquor regulation and control; this is not so. Our courts have never
held that the state has preempted this field. On the
contrary, they have held that where a general grant of
power is given unless expressly prohibited, cities may
pass concurrent ordinances and regulations covering
the same area as the state statute so long as the local
ordinance does not exceed the state law in its requirements.
"Does Sec. 57-5-14, R.S.U. 1933, being of
state-wide application and designed to prevent
driving anywhere in the state while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, prevent the enactment of an ordinance preventing in the cities
the same thing?
"The solution of this question depends on the
following principle: An ordinance dealing with
the same subject as a statute is invalid only if
prohibited by the statute or inconsistent therewith." (Cases cited). Salt Lake City vs. Kusse,
97 Utah 913, 93 P.2d 671, 1938.
In the case of American Fork v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231,
134< p. 739 ( 1913) , this court considered a case involving
local ordinances controlling intoxicating liquor.
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"In view of the several provisions of the
statutes we have quoted above, can any reasonable doubt exist in the mind of any one that the
Legislature intended to and did convey ample
power upon the municipalities of this state to
pass ordinances prohibiting and punishing the
sale or other disposition in any manner within the
corporate jurisdiction of intoxicating liquors, and
this may be done although the statutes of the
state likewise prohibit and punish such sales
and disposition·~ The overwhelming weight of
authority in this country is to the effect that,
where such power is conferred upon municipalities, they may prohibit and punish the same acts
that are prohibited and punished by the state
laws, and may impose the same penalties imposed by the state laws, if within the jurisdiction
of the municipal courts. 2 McQuillin, Mun.
Corps. §§877, 878; 28 Cyc. 696; Black on Int.
Simmons, 4 Okla. Cr. 662, 112 Pac. 951; same
case on rehearing, 5 Okla. Cr. 399, 115 Pac.
380, where the authorities upon the subject are
reviewed in an exhaustive opinion. To the same
effect is Oklahoma City v. Spence (Okla. Cr.)
126 Pac. 701."
There is some belief that Ri,ggins vs. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645
( 1935), holds the 1935 Utah Liquor Control Act completely preempted the field but when read in full context, it is readily discernible that the court was talking
about the state's role of being in business, to-wit, selling
intoxicating liquor through its own liquor stores. The
court was not concerned with the question of regulation
of consumption, but with protecting a state owned
monopoly. We quote:
14

'_''¥ e are unable to perceive any constitutional
objections to the state engaging in the sale and
distribution of intoxicating liquors. The authority of the Legislature under its police power to
r~gulat~ and prohibit traffic in intoxicating
liquors is too well established to admit or debate.
Notwithstanding the repeal of the prohibition
clause of our State Constitution, the Legislature
may entirely prohibit the manufacture, sale, and
use of intoxicating liquor. No constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs are infringed because the
Legislature has seen fit to provide that the state
shall occupy the entire field, or nearly so, of the
sale and distribution of intoxicating liquors.
Such in effect is the holding of this court in the
case of Utah Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Stewart,
8 2Utah 198, 23 P. (2d) 229. Numerous authorities sustaining such legislative powers will be
found collected in that case."
The court finally decided that the Liquor Commission
had standing to sue in a civil action to enjoin various
businesses from selling intoxicating liquor.
Procedurally, the duty falls upon the party attacking the ordinance to establish the invalidity of the ordinance in question.
"It is a familiar rule of law that, where cities
are given general power to pass an ordinance
upon a given subject, the presumption .Prevails
that ordinances passed upon that subject are
valid until the contrary is made to appear and
that the burden of showing their invalidity is
upon the person .assailing them. After alh~d~np
to this presumption the author of McQmllm s
Mun. Ords. Sec. 384 says: 'Therefore, the gen-
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eral rule is that, when the validity of an ordinance
is called in question, the burden is upon the party
who denies the validity to demonstrate it by
proper proof, as where the question of the lack
of power to enact is raised.' ". Am. Fork vs.
Charlier, up. cit.
Under Section 10-8-42, U.C.A. 1953, defendant
has received a general grant to regulate intoxicating
liquor. The burden thus falls upon plaintiff to establish
that the state enactments covering intoxicating liquors
have expressly prohibited the local governing agencies
from passing ordinances which regulate but do not circumvent the state laws. Therefore, until plaintiff firmly
proves an express prohibition, the presumption of the
validity of the ordinance now in question must prevail.
This they have not done.

POINT IV
SALT LAKE CITY'S ORDINANCE LICENSING THE NONPROFIT SOCIAL CLUBS,
ATHLETIC AND RECREATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We can see from the foregoing arguments that the
local governing body has been granted the authority
to pass an ordinance licensing and regulating nonprofit
clubs and associations. In considering the provisions of
the ordinance being attached, this court in its right of
judicial review must limit itself to the question of
whether the requirements of the ordinance are unreason-
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able and discriminatory beyond constitutional guarantee. This general rule of law is best stated in 33 Am.
J ur., Licenses, Section 18:
"Discretion of Legislature; Province of Courts.
It is the province of the legislature to determine
whether the conditions exist which warrant the
exercise of the power to regulate or to license
under the police power, but the question as to
what are proper subject of its exercise is clearly
a judicial one. In this respect, the legislature
has a wise discretion in determining whether a
business or occupation shall be barred to the dishonest or incompetent, and courts will not pass
upon the question of the wisdom of the legislature in requiring a license from a certain class
of persons to correct an extortionate practice
found to exist on the part of such persons."
Inasmuch as appellant has attacked the ordinance
section by section in the appendix to his brief, we will
briefly review the main areas covered by the ordinance.
1. There are three classes of license under the
ordinance. It is well settled law that the governing
body may classify establishments or persons into various
areas requiring a different fee to be paid so long as
the discriminatory is not discriminatory or unreasonable. Salt Lake City vs. Christensen Co., 34 U. 38, 95
P. 523, 17 A.L.R. (N.S.) 898; Clark v. Titusville,
184 U.S. 329, 22 S.Ct. 382, 46 L.Ed. 569; Menlove
v. Salt Lake County, 18 U.2d 203, 418 P.2d 227;
Howe v. State Tax Commission, IO U.2d 362, 353 P.2d
468, and McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edi-
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tion Revised, §26.60. These classes are completely reasonable as they are based on the activities of the licensee
and all persons similarly situated are treated alike.
2. Sections 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 simply require

that the clubs, regardless of their classification, abide
laws of general acceptance in the field of health protection, fire protection and protection against violation
of criminal laws. These requirements are reiterations
of state enactments and are in no way additional burdens
upon the clubs as they apply to all persons in society.
Sections 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25
are administrative in character and simply deal with
the application of other sections of the ordinance. Sections 5, 7 and 9 deal with the necessary information
that must be included in the application for the license.
They require identification of the responsible officers
and directors of the club or association who change
from year to year and the statement that in case of beer
or liquor consumption, the officers and employees are
abiding by state law. Furthermore, the contents of
section 9 are taken from Section 16-6-13.1 which requires the posting of bylaws or house rules of a nonprofit corporation.
3. The requirement of filing a financial report

with the application for license as indicated under section r and allowing the license assessor immediate
access to the books of the club as stated in section 10
has been challenged by both the state and the private
clubs. Inasmuch as we are dealing here with nonprofit
organizations who are being licensed under a single
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license and at a greatly reduced fee compared with the
fees paid by a business who sponsor the same activities,
it is of paramount interest that the city know whether
the club is, in fact, organized as a nonprofit entity
but in reality operating for pecuniary profit. By the
requirement of filing a financial statement and allowing
immediate access to the books, the city can ascertain
whether it should assess the normal business licen.se fee
as required for all businesses similarly situated. It may,
therefore, license each separate activity of the club if
the club is, in fact, a business organization. The city
must be allowed to look past the outward facade of
a nonprofit organization to ascertain whether it is properly being regulated under the powers given by the
state.
Because of the rather privileged position of the
liquor locker club to store liquor on its premises, unscrupulous individuals may use a nonprofit organzation
as a sham to avoid law enforcement. This type of action
may be readily ascertained upon reading the financial
statement and auditing the books. The State of Utah
pays to Salt Lake City a portion of its liquor profits
to enforce the liquor laws of this state, but now turns
around and requires that law enforcement officers of
the city be denied the means of discovering unscrupulous individuals who would by deception avoid such
enforcement. Because the city is required to regulate
social organizations differently than business organizations ,the governing body has the right to check into
their internal affairs to ascertain any improprieties.
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'Vhen dealing with liquor consumption, one must
be cognizant that this is not a constitutional right given
to any organization or individual but is a privilege given
pursuant to the police power which has been delegated
to respondent by the appellant.

POINT V
IN THE C 0 N S 0 L I DATED CASES
BROUGHT BY THE NONPROFIT CORPORATION CLUBS AGAINST SALT LAKE
CITY, THE COURT DID ERR IN RULING
THAT THE MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEl\1ENT OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO PROCURE A PROPER SEARCH WARRANT
PRIOR TO THEIR INSPECTING THE CLUB
ROOlVI OF SUCH NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS.
Section 16-6-14 U.C.A. 1953, makes as a condition
of the existence of these clubs the requirement that they
allow immediate access to the peace officers of this state.
In the court's memorandum decision, it held that it was
not striking down this provision of state law. (R 7-9)
It nevertheless required that local officers procure
search warrants before entering the clubs for an inspection. These two findings are inconsistent.
The right to organize a liquor locker club is not
a constitutional right but a privilege granted by the
state subject to certain restraints and regulations as
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contained in the enacting statutes. The nonprofit corporation~ who organize under the liquor locker club
provisions have agreed to allow ready access to their
premises by peace officers of the state, county and local
governments.
Protection of a right can only apply when there
is a right in existence. Because an individual has certain
inalienable rights, it does not necessarily follow that
organizations fall heir to these same righti; simply because individuals are associated therewith. Again we
must consider that no person or entity has any rights
in the use, possession or storage of liquor except those
given by the state puri;uant to its police power.
When a group of people desire to organize a nonprofit liquor locker club and gain those privileges that
are granted by the state, they must be willing to accept
the conditions associated with such privileges. When
plaintiffs agreed to the condition allowing unlimited
access to their premises by peace officers, they have no
rights which may be protected under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
and Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
To hold as the trial court did in this matter is to
frustrate the very intention of the Legislature which
passed the liquor locker club law. The Legislature obviously by its inclusion of Section 16-6-14 intended that
the liquor laws not be frustrated by locked doors which
could only be opened by keys or other devices held by
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members of said club. The time delay effected by requiring the local enforcement officers to await the opening
of said doors would give ample opportunity to unscrupulous individuals to eliminate all evidence of wrong
doing and thus thwart the commands of the state liquor
code and makes it almost impossible for the law enforcement officers to discover such violations.

CONCLUSION
The trial courts who heard these two different case~
did not err in holding that the city had the right and
power to license social clubs, athletic and recreational
associations and that they held the power to license and
regulate these clubs in regards to their activities revolving around the consumption of liquor. Judge Aldon J.
Anderson, after much study and research, being completely and properly advised when he made his decision,
held that the State of Utah was not the proper party
to challenge the constitutionality of the state statutes
involved herein and of the ordinance being attacked.
The trial court in Case No. 1117 4, when confronted with
the actual parties to be regulated, fully upheld the city's
position that the state had not preempted to itself regulation of nonprofit corporations operating as liquor
locker clubs but did err in holding that local peace
officers were required to obtain a search warrant before
the club need allow them access to their premises. As a
condition of their existence, these nonprofit private
clubs agreed to immediate access by law enforcement
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officers to the premises of the clubs. We feel from our
foregoing argument that there can be no doubt that
the holding of the trial courts be upheld except for that
portion of Judge Keller's decision requiring our local
enforcement officers to first procure a search warrant
before investigation of private clubs.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOL1\1GREN
City Attorney
PAUL G. GRANT
Assistant City Attorney
414 City & County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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